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Si  nee  our  last  revievl,  we  ha.ve  made  some  progress  on 
the  inflationary front.  Th~ worst  countries  hnve  got  better~ 
The.middle  range  countries  have  remained  about  the  same,  - with  a  shade  of  imnrovemcnt.  And.  the  best  has  remained 
as  £Ood  as  it was.  The  overall  B/Ps  o£  the  Com:nunity 
has  improved,  not  quite as  f<!st  as  we  hoped,  but  never-
tholes~  s ignif  ic ant ly,  thanl~s mainly  to  a  big  change 
in  the  U.K.  and  Italy.  There  hns  been  greater  in.ter~1al 
exchange  ~ate stability.  Eut  our  growth  rates,  bo~h 
in the  stronger  and  the  ·:-:eal:~c·r  ccono1:1ics,  unliice  those 
of the  other  t,..,vo  main  trading  blocs~  nrc  '~ell  short  of 
the targets  agreed  upon  at  the  Downing  Street  Su~rnit  in 
~1ay,  and  the·te  is. no  sign of  any  early sDurt. 
There  has  been  no  inmrovemen.t  in  unemployment. 
It  has  got  marginally worse.  It  is  common,  ld!::h  little· 
more  than marginal  differences,  to all our  Member  States, 
much  more  so  than  inflation or  B/Ps  problems  or  even 
low  growth.  It  is illustrated  by  e;11e rgenc  y  act ion which 
we  have  to  take,  and  which  are  reported  to  you  in our 
sectoral  pa-per  for  one  after another  of cur  major 
...  t  '1  .  ,_.h  •.  ,,.  liWUstrles,  ext1  es,  ste21,  Sdl?Jttlll.:•.Ing.  And  in 
each case  we  have  to  nrocecd  by  restructuring  and 
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future  for  the  remainder.  In  one  •)f  our  pa!.)e-r's,  '>'r'e  have 
identified the  most  promiEinz  gro~th industries  : 
aeronautics,  telcconi~unicatj_o;ls,  electt·onics  ~  data 
processing,  energy  and  '2rtcr~·y  sa\'ine. 
particularly the  last,  could  take  on  significant  amounts 
of  1 abo  u r  ~  bat  in  g 0 ru: r a 1  t ;  1 c y  '.i r-c  ;1;.::; n l f c s t l y  c a!) it  a 1 
and  net  J;::bour  inten:~:i..vc. - 2.-
·  (p.  I  therefore  do  not believe that  any  conventional 
upsl.;ing  is going  to  solve  our  unemployment  problem.  It 
would  require  5!-6\  growth  rates  throughout  the  Community 
over  a  3  to  5  year  period  to  recreate previous  levels 
for  the  existing  labour  force.  Within  the  existing 
framework  does  anyone  regard this likely  ?  41\  would 
be  optimistic.  3%  might  be  more  realistic  •. 
There  is  an  additional  factor.  Demographic 
projections based  on  those  who  might  be  born  are notoriously 
unreliable.  Projections  based  on  those  already born  are 
of an  altogether different  order.  They  show  that between 
now  and  1985  many  more  people  will  become  16  than will 
become Is.  After  that it will  change.  But  in the  next 
eight years  the  potential  labour  force will  increase  by. 
nine  million against  a  population  increase of six million 
In conditions  of full  employment  this would  be  a  strength. 
In conditions  of unemployment  it is  an  additional  problem. 
We  need  to  employ still more  in relation to  the per  capita 
demand.  It will  be  more  acute  in Germany,  the  U.K.,  and 
Denmark,  and  mpst  of all  in Germany,  where  the population 
is likely to  decline  by  1!  million and  the  labour  force 
to  increase  by  21_million  •. 
Therefore  in my  view  there  is no  conventional  way 
out.  If we  are  going  to  change  unemployment  trends 
decisively,  we  need  a  major  new  stimulus  of  a  historic 
dimension,  comparable  with  the  onset  of the  railway 
age  130  years  ago  or  the post-war  impact  of the  combination 
of the need  for  reconstruction  and  the  spread  in the 'sos 
and  60s  of what  were  previously middle  class  standards  of 
consumption. 
To  some  extent,  but  by  no  means  wholly~ such 
impulses  cannot  be  continued.  Yet  those  round this  table 
are capable  of making  a  decision contributive.  Otherwise 
we  will all contribute to presiding  over  what  in  the  context 
of history may  be  a  period of  tactical victories  but  of 
strategic defeat. - 3  -
Beyond  this there  are  two  additiorial  factors  : 
(1)  Enlargement.  Assumption  of this must clearly 
also  be  our working  hypothesis.  Are  we  prepared to 
allow it to  lead to  a  weakening  and  loosening of the 
Community,  or  are  we  not  ?  Left  to  itself it will. 
A heavier body,  particularly with the  problems  the  new 
countries will  bring  - although  they can be  exaggerated  -
without  a  stronger  bone  and  sinew  structure will  be 
more  torpid,  more  flaccid,  less  coherent.  But  it need 
not  be  so.  It could,to  the contrary,  give  us  the 
spur  to move  forward  in the way  that  in any  event 
we  need  to  do.  And  if we  do  not,  the  enlargement  would 
be  self-~efeating.  The  new  members  have  made  it clear 
that  they  want  the  sustenance  of  a  strong  and  coherent 
··community.  They  do  not  want  to  find  that  in  the process 
of joining  they  have  damaged  the  pot~ntial which attracts 
them. 
(2)  We  have  not  got  a  world  monetary  system.  We  had  one 
for  25  years  after Bretton Woods,  and  on  the wh6le  it 
worked  very well.  But  it was  based  on  a  cpmplete  dollar 
hegemony.  It began  to  crack  in  1968.  It fissured  in 
1971.  Since  then it has  jtist  staggered on.  And  today 
the dollar  looks  less  satisfactory than  ever  as  the only 
real  international ~edium of  exchange  that  we  have.  Its 
continuous  weakness  can  be  a  great de-stabiliser.  We  aTe 
almost  certainly the  only  group  in the  world  capable of 
providing  not  a  complete  substitute but  an  alternative. 
I  see  no  medium  term way  forward  except  by  giving 
a  new,  non-utopian but more  urgent  and  contemporary  impulse 
to  the  old  idea  of  economic  and  monetary  union,  particularly 
its monetary  aspect. 
The  benefits both  to  our  stronger  and  weaker  economies 
could  be  immense,  certainly amounting  to  an  impulse  comnarable 
with that which  came  from  the  establishment  of  the  Customs 
Union  itself. c: 
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The  balance  between benefits  for  both  stronger  and 
weaker  economies  is  in my  view  essential.  We  will never,  and 
understandably never,  get major  steps  forward  that are  in the 
interest  of  only  one  or the  other.  But  this  need  not  be  so. 
The  strong  have  an  immense  amount  to  gain  from  the  strengthening 
and  underpinning  of the  unity of the market,  that  is its 
monetary  and political stability. 
For  the  weaker  economies  there  are  also  immense,  albeit 
different,  advantages:  above  all  ~rotection from  the  gusts  of 
exchange  rate inflation and  other unsets,  including  those 
arising  from  balance  of payments  difficulties,  which  come 
from  being  tossed  about  as  frail  small craft  on  an  irrational 
world  monetary  sea.  As  part  of the  process  there must  also  be 
greater transfers  of resources.  Clearly this would  need  to 
be within a  clear  framework  of purpose  and  not  just as 
charitable handouts.  Moreover  there would  have  to  be  the 
clearer  and  more  permanent  acceptance  of  common  flOnetary  and 
anti-inflationary disciplines. 
But  it is all Members  of the  Community,  strong  and  weak 
and  those  in between,  which  would  stand to benefit  from  a 
renewal  of that ~ore broadly  based  and  robust  economic  expansion 
which  only  an  economic  and  monetary union w6uld  permit.  It is 
worth  reflecting on  how  the United  States  is at present  able 
to  sustain its expansion  in spite of certain major  economic 
weaknesses.  Not  all.  of us  are  strong all the  time,  nor  always 
weak.  Those  at present  in between  have  shown  great  economic 
dynamism  in the past  decade  but  now  seem  hamstrung  by  the. 
interaction of factors  making  for  external  and  internal 
·monetary  instability. 
The  moment  is  pro~itious for  the  acceptance  of much 
stron~er common  disciplines,  providing  these  balancing  factors 
were  there.  No-one  can  contemplate  the  course  of  the past  fe'" 
years  in  some  of  our  member  countries  and  believe that  there is 
salvation in monetary  indiscinline,  in· letting  the  exchange  rate 
and  the  money  supply  go  a~d accepting  the  inflationary consequences. 
You  get  the  inflation,  your  currency  sinks,  but  you  are  not  com-
pensated  by  greater  growth  or  reduced  unemployment.  It is only 
return to discipline which  produces  an  improvement  and  the 
beginning  of the  establishment  of  a  platform  fo  sustained growth. 
I  As  a  former - 4a  .. 
As  a  former  British Minister,  I  can  refer to  the 
striking example  of my  own  country's recent 
experiences. 
I  believe there are  two  essential  further !lOints 
in the analysis. 
(i)  We  will not  get monetary union  either by"just 
I  proclaiming it ( 
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proclaiming it and  believing that  separate currencies 
can be  told  not  to diverge,  nor  by  an  inevitability of 
gradualism  in which  everything  hap~ens painlessly, 
effortlessly,  without  any  major  act  of nolitical will. 
(ii)  Second,  it is not  the  case that an  equality of 
performance  is  a  pre-requisite for  ENU.  Common  policy, 
common  disciplines.  Yes,  obviously yes.  But  not  the 
same  standards  of  living,  levels  of output  in Hamburg 
and  Palermo,  or  in the  future  Conenhagen  and  Lisbon. 
Monetary unions  have  worked  to  the benefits of both 
richer  and  poorer  areas  with at  least  equal  discrepancies 
in the past.  They  do  indeed  work  within  our  ~ember States 
today where  the natural discrepancies  are very great,  although 
greatly evened  u~ by  fiscal  transfers.  This  distinction is 
vital.  If equality of performance were  necessary,  it would 
be  meaningless  to  talk  about  E~U for  our  lifetime or  even  1 
our  children's  lifetime. 
In this situation we  need to  look  ~fresh at  w~at 
monetary union would  involve  for  the  Community.  I  should 
emphasise  at  the  outset that  I  do  not  foresee  such  a  union 
as  something  for  tomorrow,  or  even  the day after tomorrow. 
But  if we  are  to·s~t ourselves  an  objective,  it should  be 
one  within practical reach,  something  not  over  the  horizon 
but at  least  on  the  horizon.  After all,  in the  long  run 
we  are all deu.d.  What  I  env.isage  in the  short  run  is 
the setting of  an  objective  and  the reorientation of 
our  existing policies  in  terms  of it.  Thus  when  we  take, 
as  we  must,  decisions  on  major  economic  and  monetary  issues, 
we  should  do  so  within the  framework  of policies which will 
eventually  lead  to  monetary union.  This  is  less  than 
making  for union  in  a  straight  line;  but  it is more  than 
the  coordination which  is  sometimes  held  up  as  sufficient 
for  our  current  needs. 
What  now  has  monetary union  to offer  ?  It would 
obviously  imply  a  lot  in  terms  of  European political 
integration,  but  I  doubt  if any  among  you  would  be willing 
to take  a  sten of this size unless  you  were  convinced  that 
there was  a  clear,  functional  and  economic  need  rJr it. 
Europe  will  not  accept - 6  -
it purely for  ideological  reasons. 
look at  the nature of  the proposition 
endeavoured  to  do  in some  detail  in  a 
I  believe that if you 
in this light,  as  I 
speech recently 
in Florence,  deploying  seven  separate  arguments,  that 
the  economic  case  is vastly stronger than it is commonly 
sup~osed to be. 
Todav  I  do  not  ask  those  of you  who  are still perhaps 
a  little sceptical to  accent  this  areument  to the  ~oint of 
a  major  new,  immediate  commitment.  But  I  do  ask  you  to 
give  the  idea  of  a  renewed  Community  initiative in  t~is 
area  a  'fair wind'.  To  do  this  in a  way  that  is 
reasonably prudent  at this early stage,  yet  useful  in 
itself,  and  also  sufficient  to carry credibility and  to 
reawaken  interest outside  the  Community  institutions, 
I  ask  you  to do  three  things  : 
First,  agree  to  a  number  of practical  initiatives~ 
and  encourige  others  that are  in train.  Here  I  hav~ in 
mind  the  new  Community  Loan  instrument,  the  renovation 
of the  Regional:Fund,  and  measures  to  improve  economic 
policy coordination,  our  payments  support  ~echanisms,  to 
alleviate  structur~l  proble~s in certain industries,  and 
youth  unemployment.  Only  the  new  Community  Loan 
instrument  needs  to  be  dis~ussed in any  substance at  this 
stage  in our proceedings  (on  this  I  would  like  Francis 
Ortoli  to  say  a  word  at  a  convenient moment); 
Second,  encourage  the·Commission to elaborate  in 
more  detail what,  in today's very  differen~:circumstances 
as  compared  to  the  beginning  of this decade,  would  be 
the conditions  and merits  of  an  accelerated move  to 
economic  and monetary  union.  Here  I  have  in mind  two 
kinds  of  work  on  the  one  hand,  analysis  of why  and 
how  the union  would  change  so  signific~ntly for  the 
better our prospects  for  employment,  and  stable monetary 
conditions;  on  the  other  hand,  what  should  be  the design 
of the  bones  and  sinews  of  the  union.  Here  we  need  to 
look  for  a  model  for  the  Community's  mometary,  financial 
and  institutional organisation which  should  almost  certainly 
be  something  sui  g~~~~i~~  corres~onding to  no  preconceived ( 
....  7  ..... 
prototype. 
In  consi~ering what  its shape  and  powers  might 
be,· I  think we  have  to  go  for  something  small  in size 
and  limited  in the  scope  of its responsibilities.  The 
federal  organisation of the United  States,  with its 
massive  nowers  in the  field of  social  security,  is not 
only no  analogy,  but  almost  the  opposite of what  I  have 
in mind.  I  would  envisage  a  decentralised  form  of 
monetary  union  in which  the  public  nrocurement  of 
goods  arid  services  is primarily in national,  regional 
or other  hands.  The  public  finance  function  would 
be  limit-ed  to  a  fmv  important  kinds  of financial 
transfer,  designed  to  fulfil  specific tasks  in 
sectors of particular concern  to  the  Community,  and 
assuring  the  flow  of resources  necessary  to  sustain 
monetary union.  For  these purposes  only  a  small central/ 
bureaucracy would  required.  I  doubt  if any  of  the  Member 
States would  wish  otherwise. 
Third,  a~ree now  to  a  new  procedure .·for /r~lling 
five-year  programme,  suojec~ to  annual  review  and  co~trol, 
and  so  provide  the  formal  framework  in which  we  can put 
together  the  individual practical  steps  of progress  and 
relate them  to  the  broader  perspective  as  and  when  this 
takes  firmer  shape. 
In conclusion,  I  believe the  Euronean  Council  should 
deliberate  in such  a  way  as  to  reawaken  interest outside . 
the  Community  institutions  in this project  - in political, 
academic,  business  and  trade union circles.  The  issues 
at  stake  are  so  great  and  difficult  that  we  can  only benefit 
from  a  neriod  of  renewed  debate  and  analvsis  across  the  .  ' 
whole  of the  Community.  I  believe  the·  fundamental 
proposition is robust  eno~gh to  derive  increased rigour  and 
support· ·from ·such  a  process.  Economic  and  monetary  union  wi 11 
in any  case  have  to  come  to  be  seen  as  a  compelling  necessity 
by  a  wide  range  of public  o~inion before it can  ha~pen.  But 
without  the will  to make  it happen  and  to direr•  our 
intermediate policies,  we  would  be  Without  a  lodestar  in 
- - _.  .  --- -- ,!  -~  ~ ... 